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I.  Setting the problem: the link between inequality and
redistribution
One  of  key  relationships  in  the  recent  literature  on  inequality  and  growth
(Perotti  1992;  Perotti  1993;  Persson  and  Tabellini  1991;  Bertola  1993;
Alesina  and  Rodrik  1994;  Alesina  and  Perotti  1994)  concerns  the  link
between  market-generated  income  inequality  and  extent  of redistribution.  In
Perotti's  (1996,  pp.  1  5 1) extensive  empirical  review  of the  different  theories
linking  growth,  income  distribution  and  democracy  the  relationship  appears
under  the  title  of  "endogenous  fiscal  policy  approach."  The  fiscal  policy
approach  includes  two  steps  or  structural  equations.  The  first  step  (the
political  mechanism)  argues  that  greater  income  inequality  leads  to  greater
redistribution  and  thus  to  more  distorsionary  taxation.  The  second  step  (the
economic  mechanism)  argues  that  greater  distorsionary  taxation  reduces
growth.  The  outcome  is,  of  course,  that  greater  income  inequality  slows
down  growth.  However,  in this  paper,  we are  concerned  solely  with  the  first
step-the  political  mechanism.
The political  mechanism  works  through  the  median  voter  hypothesis.
According  to the  hypothesis,  when  individuals  are  ordered  according  to their
factor  (or  market)  income,  2  the  median  voter  (=the  individual  with  the
median  level  of  income)  will  be,  in  unequal  societies,  relatively  poor.  His
income  will be  low  in relation  to  mean  income.  If one  further  assumes  that
net  transfers  (government  cash  transfers  minus  direct  taxes)  are  progressive,
then the  median  voter has more  to  gain from transfers  than  he would  pay  out
in  taxes.  Obviously,  the  more  unequal  the  distribution,  the  more  the  median
voter  has to gain through  the joint  action  of taxes  and transfers,  and the more
likely  is  he  to  vote  for  higher  taxes  and  transfers.  3  The  more  unequal
societies  will, therefore,  select  greater  redistribution.
2  Factor income  is income before government fiscal redistribution  (via cash social transfers  and personal
income taxes). Factor (=market) income  includes wages  and bonuses, property income, self-employment
incomed, gifts and remittances, home consumption etc.  In the  rest of  the paper, the terms  "factor"  and
"market"  income will be used interchangeably
3As  Alesina and Perotti (1994, p. 360) write "in the fiscal channel [explanation], the level of government
expenditure  and taxation  is the result  of a  voting process  in which  income  is a main  determinant  of  a
voter's preferences: in particular, poor voters will favor a high taxation."3
This approach assumes that (1) voters'  decisions on transfers and taxes
are  determined  solely  by  their  position  in  income  distribution,  (2)  the
preferences  are  single-peaked,  and  (3)  all  (or  almost  all)  individuals  are
voters.  The last point implies that the relationship between market-generated
inequality  and  redistribution  should  be  stronger  in  democracies  than  in
authoritarian  regimes  where  the  governments  can  decide  to  ignore  the
preferences of the poor (see Perotti  1996, p.  171; Alesina and Perotti, 1994;
Alesina and Rodrik,  1994, p. 478).
Almost no author among the many  who have written  on the  subject
empirically  estimates  the  structural  equation  (the  political  mechanism
equation).  What  the  authors  do  in  the  empirical  part  is  to  estimate  the
reduced form equation where inequality in distribution ofdisposable income
is used as a regressor to explain growth rate over a period of time (Persson
and  Tabellini  1991; Alesina  and Rodrik,  1994; Alesina  and Perotti  1994;
Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). They do this because the data needed to estimate
the  structural  equation  are  much  more  difficult  to  obtain:  factor  income
distribution  was, until  recently., unavailable  and if one lacks factor income
distribution,  one cannot calculate the  extent of redistribution.  Thus, neither
the  extent  of  redistribution  nor  the  mechanism  by  which  it  occurs-the
median voter hypothesis-was  tlested  directly.
There  are,  however,  a  few  exceptions.  Perotti  (1993  and  1996),
Easterly  and  Rebelo  (1993,  p.  436),  and Bassett,  Burkett  and  Putterman
(1999) estimate the structural equation of the type
(1)  T= f(Id,Z)
where the T denotes taxes or social transfers as a share of GDP, or as
in  Perotti  (1996)  the  marginal  tax  rate. Id  is  an  index  of  inequality  of
disposable income, and Z other relevant variables (e.g. a democracy dummy
variable, or percent of population over 65 years of age since this their larger
share  should  imply  greater  transfers  for  pensions).  Perotti's  1996 paper
presents  the  most  detailed  test  of  the  hypothesis.  He  finds  lack  of  a
significant relationship  between  the equality variable  ("middle  class share"
defined as the combined income shares of the third and fourth quintiles  of
the population ranked according todisposable income) and marginal tax rate
in various  formulations:  whether  the share  of the  middle class  is included4
alone in the equation, or is interacted with a democracy  dummy. Even in a
sample  of  democracies  alone  the coefficient  has  the  right  sign but  is  not
significant (Perotti,  1996, Table 8, p.  170). When, instead  of marginal tax
rate, Perotti uses, on the left-hand side, social security and welfare, or health
and housing, or education  expenditures (each  as  a share of  GDP), greater
inequality  in  disposable  income  is associated  with  greater  social transfers
only in the case of  democracies and for social  security and welfare alone.
Perotti  concludes  (p.  172)  that  "...there  is  ...  very  little  evidence  of  a
negative association between equality and fiscal variables in democracies. It
is true that in the political mechanism, [the variable that interacts the share of
the middle class and democracy] has the expected negative sign in four cases
out of six, but social security and welfare is the only type of expenditure for
which  it  is  significant."  More  recently,  Bassett,  Burkett  and  Putterman
(1999) have reestimated these relationships using three redistribution proxies
(public transfers, social security transfers, and social security and education
as share of GDP), and share of the middle quintiles indisposable income as
inequality  proxy.  They too  find  that  the  coefficient  on  the  median  voter
either  has  a  "wrong"  sign  (higher  share  of  the  middle  class  increases
transfers)  or is not statistically significant.  Moreover, the results  are highly
unstable. Thus,  in the two  only direct empirical tests  of the  median  voter
hypothesis, the hypothesis is found wanting.
However, this  approach  is doubly unfortunate  because  both the  left-
hand side and the right-hand  side variables are misspecified.  On the right-
hand  side, there  is disposable  income inequality  which  is inequality after
both  taxes  and  transfers.  However,  people's  voting  decisions  on
redistribution  are  based  on  their  incomes  before  redistribution. 4 It  is
methodologically  incorrect to  explain  people's  decision  about the  optimal
level of taxes and transfers as dependent on the distribution which emerges
as  a  consequence  of  that  decision.  This  approach  creates  also  a  time-
consistency problem, for in reality, people first receive their factor incomes,
and  then  decide  how  much  of  it they  are  willing  to  redistribute  through
taxation  and  social  transfers.  Therefore,  the  methodologically  correct
approach is to make the decision  on the extent  of redistribution  depend  on
the distribution of market or  factor  (pre-transfer andpre-tax)  income.
'  For example, Alesina and Rodrik (1994) are aware of that because they model a person's decision on the
level of taxation on his capital/labor income ratio, that is on his factor incomes.5
The dependent  variable  (the  share  of government  transfers  in GDP, or
the  marginal  tax  rate)  is also  wrong.  It  is not  the  share  of  G]DP that  matters
but  how redistributive  the  trans:fers and  taxes  are.  One  can  easily  imagine  a
situation  where  a  society  has  large  taxes  and  transfers  whose  contributors
and  beneficiaries  are the  same  people.  Looking  at transfers'  or  taxes'  share
in GDP  would  give  the mistaken  impression  that  the  society  has chosen  a lot
of redistribution  while  the  reality  is exactly  the  opposite:  redlistribution  may
be  minimal.  In  effect,  corporatist  societies  of  continental  Europe  (Austria,
Germany)  are  often  considered  (see  Esping-Andersen,  1990)  to  engage
predominantly  in  such  kinds  of  policies.  Le  Grand  (1982)  has  similarly
argued  that  most  transfers  are  captured  by  the  middle  class.  The  essential
point  is  that  size  of  transfers  is  an  imperfect  indicator  of  the  amount  of
redistribution.  A  correct  approaLch  would  be  to  look  at how  much  have  the
bottom  groups  of  population  (according  to  factor  income)  increased  their
share  in disposable  income,  that is what is their  income  gain.
Therefore,  the relationship  we want to test  is:
(2)  R =  f(Im, Z)
where  R =  an index  of  redistribution,  im  = an index  of  inequality  of
factor  incomes.  Equation  (2)  says  that  the  extent  of  redistribution  is  a
function  of  initial  inequality  with  which  factor  income  is distributed.  Note
that  this  formulation  is quite  flexible:  voters  may  decide  to  choose  small  but
very  redistributive  programs,  or  a  series  of  large,  but  less  redistributive,
programs.  Both may reduce  initial  inequality  equally.
There  are  two  hypotheses  we  want  to  test.  First,  that  more  unequal
countries  redistribute  more;  second,  to  look  at how  one possible  explanation
of why this  may  be so-the  median  voter  hypothesis-  performs.  These  are
two distinct  hypotheses.  The first  is a purely  empirical  statement.  The second
is a specific  political  mechanism.
Note  that  both  sides  of  equation  (2)  are  different  from  (1).  This  is
because  both  sides  of  (1)  are  proxies  for  the  "true"  variables:  the  share  of
transfers  in GDP  or the marginal  tax  rate,  proxy  for redistribution;  inequality
in distribution  of disposable  income  proxies  for inequality  in  distribution  of
factor  income.  As mentioned  before,  the  reason  why researchers  were  using6
equation  (1)  rather  than  (2)  is  because  information  on  factor  income
inequality which is indispensable to calculate both sides of equations (2) is,
for most countries, unavailable.  In effect, the income  distribution  statistics
that we normally  have are almost without exception  statistics of disposable
or gross (market  plus  transfers) income.  It is only recently that, thanks to
Luxembourg Income Survey (LIS) data base, factor income distributions for
a number of countries have  become available. The LIS data enable one to
observe  how  income  distribution  changes  as  one  moves  from  the  pure
market-determined  incomes  to incomes  that include  also  government  cash
transfers  (gross  income)  and  finally  to  disposable  income  (gross  income
minus  direct personal taxes). Moreover, since almost all countries in the LIS
data base are democracies, the two hypotheses can be tested precisely for the
countries where they are supposed to hold the most.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the
data  base.  Section  III  looks  at  the  relationship  between  factor  income
inequality and redistribution.  Section IV tests the median voter hypothesis,
and Section V concludes the paper.
XI.  Description of the data base
We use the data for 24 countries which were are, with two exceptions,
democracies at the time of the surveys. ' The following country data sets are
included:  Australia  1981,  1985, 1989,  and 1994; Belgium  1985,  1988 and
1992; Canada 1975, 1987, 1991 and 1994; Czech Republic  1992; Denmark
1987 and 1992; Finland 1987,  1991 and 1995; France  1979, 1981, 1984 and
1989; West  Germany  1973,  1978,  1981,  1984,  1989 and  1994; Hungary
1991; Ireland  1987; Israel  1979, 1986 and 1992; Italy  1986, 1991 and 1995;
Luxembourg  1985,  1991 and  1994; the Netherlands  1983, 1987,  1991 and
1994; Norway  1986, 1991 and 1995; Poland 1986, 1992, and 1995; Taiwan
(Province  of  China)  1981, 1986,  1991 and  1995;  Russia  1992 and  1995;
Slovakia 1992; Spain 1980 and 1990;Sweden 1967, 1975, 1981, 1987, 1992
and 1995; Switzerland 1982; United Kingdom 1969, 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991
and 1995; United States 1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, 1994 and 1997. Most of the
countries  were  long  established  democracies-with  at  least  20  years  of
uninterrupted democratic experience prior to the survey-while  several had
' The exceptions  are Poland  survey in 1986  and Taiwan's surveys  in 1  981 and 1986.7
only a few years of democracy prior to the survey (e.g. Spain in 1980, Russia
in 1992, Czech  republic and Slovakia in 1992, Hungary in 1991, Taiwan in
1991). We define  as  established  democracies (EDs)  all the  countries  with
exception of transition countries (7-  ussia,  Czech republic, Slovakia, Poland,
and Hungary) and Taiwan.
As mentioned, the source of data is Luxembourg Incom.e Survey (LIS)
which,  using  the  countries'  own  household  income  surveys, 6  tries  to
standardize them by making the definitions of various variables (e.g. pension
income, factor income, remittances  etc.) the same or as similar as possible.
LIS represents the only such  source of  standardized  individual unit record
data for developed  market economies. We have  used  all the  data that  LIS
currently (Fall 1999) has. They came from four "waves": the first from mid-
1970's and early 1980's; the second, from the second half of the  1980's; the
third from the late 1980's and early 1990's; and the first from mid-l990's  up
to 1997.
There is thus a total of 79 country observations. For each observation,
we have the average per capita income in local currency by decile, for the
following six distributions:
(1) distribution  of  factor  income  (when  individuals  are  ranked  by
household per capita factor income),
(2) distribution of factor incomeP  which is equal to factor income (1)
plus pension  transfers (when individuals  are ranked by household
per capita factor income P),
(3) distribution  of  gross  income  (when  individuals  are  ranked  by
household per capita gross income)
(4) distribution of disposable income (when individuals are ranked by
household per capita disposable income)
(5) distribution  of disposable income when individuals  are ranked by
household per capitafactor  income.
(6) distribution  of disposable income when individuals are ranked by
household per capitafactor income P.
6 The list of the exact individual country surveys used by  LIS to generate its data base can be found at the
website http://dpls.dacc.wisc.edu/apdu/Iisch  art.htm  l.8
Factor  income  is  defined  as  pre-transfer  and  pre-tax  income.  It
includes  wages,  self-employment  income,  income  from  ownership  of
physical and financial capital, gifts etc' Factor income P includes in addition
public pensions. This is a factor income definition specially created for this
study. The reason why we  want to include pensions  with the  usual  factor
incomes  is  because  pensions  are  a very  specific  transfer  which  does  not
respond  to  current  contingencies  nor  whose  objective  is redistribution  of
income. Pensions;  of  course,  are deferred  wages  with  some  redistribution
component. By treating pensions as  factor income, we can  focus better on
other social transfers (unemployment benefits, family allowances, and social
assistance) whose redistributive function is undeniable.
Gross  income  is  equal  to  factor  income plus  all  government  cash
transfers. Finally, disposable  income is equal to gross  incomeminus  direct
personal taxes and mandatory employee contributions'
For each type of distribution data listed above, we can easily calculate
indicators  of  inequality  as  well as  indexes  of redistribution.  For  example,
Tables la and lb show the average Gini coefficients for the four concepts of
income (factor, factor P, gross, disposable). Ginis for individual countries are
shown in Annex  Table  1. Each  concept  focuses on  a different underlying
cause  of  inequality.  Factor  income  inequality  reflects  the  distribution  of
human,  physical  and  financial  assets  as  well  as their  relative  prices.  This
would  be  distribution  in  the  absence  of  any  government  action? Gross
income  adjusts  only  for  government  cash  transfers.  Finally,  disposable
income distribution-a  statistics that is most commonly used-shows  actual
differences in the purchasing power between individuals. A simple example
'  The exact definition of factor  income, using LIS notation,  is as follows. Our factor  income  is equal to
LIS-defined factor  income [Fl=net wage and salary income (VI)  + farm self-employment income (V4) +
non-farm  self-employment income (V5) + cash property income  (V8) I plus private pensions (V32) plus
occupational public pensions (V33) plus alimony received (V34) plus other regular private income (V35)
(household transfers) plus other cash income (V36). Our factor P income is equal to our factor income plus
cash social security benefits for old age or survivors (V19).
s The exact  definitions  are  as  follows.  Gross  income  is equal  to  factor  income plus  social  insurance
transfers (sick  pay, disability pay,  social retirement  benefits, child  or family  allowances, maternity  pay,
military or veterans benefits, and other social insurance) plus social assistance transfers (means-tested cash
benefits and near-cash benefits). Gross income minus mandatory employee contributions minus income tax
equals  disposable  income.  See  Luxembourg  Income  Study  variable  definitions  in
http://lissy.ceps.lu.summary.htm.
9  This is somewhat of a simplification because if the  government were truly absent, there  would be, for
example,  more private  pensions  (which are  currently  "crowded  out" by  government  pensions)  and  the
factor distribution would be different.9
may  show  how  the  concepts  highlight  different  facets  of  distribution.
Consider  Sweden  and  the  US  in the  mid-1990's.  In  terms  of  disposable
income inequality they are, as everybody knows, very different: the Gini for
Sweden is 26, the Gini for the US much higher -actually  the highest among
all  established  democracies-  42.3  (in  1997). Yet,  the  two  countries  are
almost identical  in terms  of factor income  inequality, or in other words, in
terms  of underlying  asset  distributions:  Sweden  factor  incorne Gini  in the
1990's is 51-52, while the US's Gini ranges between 50 and 53.
Finally using the data from (5) and (6) [when income concept and the
ranking criterion differ], we can calculate exactly the extent of gain realized
by lower income  groups through the operation of the government  transfer
and tax systems.
Table  la. Inequality: descriptive statistics for all countries
Mean  Standard Maximum  (country)  Minimum (country)
deviation
(1) Factor  income Gini  46.3  5.8  62.0  (Russia 95)  31.4 (Taiwan 86)
(2) Factor income P Gini  39.8  5.6  53.2 (Ireland 87)  30.0 (Czech 92)
(3) Gross income Gini  38.5  6.7  56.4 (Russia  1995)  24.8 (Slovakia 1992)
(4) Disposable income Gini  32.2  5.3  48.8 (Russia 1995)  20.9  (Slovakia 1992)
Reduction of inequality (1)-(4)  14.1  5.3  24.9 (Sweden 1992)  -0.5 (Taiwan 1981)
Reduction of inequality (2)-(4)  7.6  3.7  15.5 (Ireland 87)  0.3 (Italy 86)
Table lb. Inequality:  descriptive statistics for established democracies
Mean  Standard  Maximum  (country)  Minimum (country)
deviation
(1) Factor  income Gini  46.6  4.2  55.8 (Ireland 87)  36.4 (Finland 87)
(2) Factor income P Gini  40.2  5.0  53.2 (Ireland 87)  32.2 (Finland 87)
(3) Gross income Gini  36.9  6.1  53.8 (US 97)  28.5 (Belgium 85)
(4) Disposable income Gini  32.1  4.7  42.3 (US 97)  23.3 (Finland 97)
Reduction of inequality (1)-(4)  14.5  4.2  24.9 (Sweden 92)  7.1  (Switzerland 81)
Reduction of inequality (2)-(4)  8.1  3.3  15.5 (Ireland 87)  0.3 (Italy 86)
On  average,  government  transfers  and  taxes  reduce  factor  income
inequality by more 14 Gini points (Table la and Table Ib). Almost a third of
factor-income  inequality  is  thus  "shaved  off'  due  to  government  action.
Most of the  reduction,  7.8  Gini points  for the  entire sample,  or  9.7  Gini10
points  for the  established  democracies,  is achieved  by  cash  transfers,  while
respectively  6.3  and  7.8  Gini  points  reduction  are  due  to  direct  personal
taxes.  It  is  also  apparent  that  the  differences  between  the  countries'  Ginis,
particularly  among  the  established  democracies,  are  small,  as  we  would
expect  from  the  countries  which  in  terms  of  their  income  level,  political
system,  and  age  structure  of  population  are  similar.  The  unweighted
coefficient  of  variation  of  disposable  income  Gini  is  about  0.15-to  be
contrasted  with  the  world  coefficient  of variation  of about  0.35  (Milanovic,
1  999).
Table  lb  also  shows  that  while  Ireland  has the  highest  factor  income
inequality  among  EDs,  it  is  overtaken  by  the  US  as  the  country  with  the
highest  gross  and  disposable  income  inequality.  At  the  opposite  end  of  the
spectrum,  are  Finland  -the  only  West  European  country  with  the  factor
income  Gini  below  40,  and  the  only  one  that  comes  close  to  Taiwan-and
Sweden.  Finland  and  Sweden  have  disposable  income  Ginis  around  25. For
the  full  sample,  however,  Slovakia  and  the  Czech  republic  have  the  lowest
disposable  income  Ginis.
Who  benefits  from  redistribution-that  is,  as we  move  from  factor  to
disposable  income?  Tables  2a and  2b  show  the  average  share  gain  for each
of  the  bottom  five  deciles  (defined  according  to  their  factor  income).  We
define  the  "sharegain"  as the  difference  between  the  share  of a given  decile
of  people  formed  according  to  factor  income  level  in  factor  and  disposable
income.  For  example,  if the  bottom  decile  receives  2 percent  of total  factor
income,  while  the  same  people  receive  8 percent  of total  disposable  income,
the  sharegain  is 6 percentage  points.  The  share  of the  bottom  decile  (formed
according  to  factor  income)  increases,  on  average,  by  5.7 percentage  points
in  the  entire  sample  or  by  5.8  percentage  points  in  EDs  (going  from
respectively  0.3  and  0.2  percent  of  total  factor  income  to  6  percent  of
disposable  income).  The  people  who  are  in the  second  decile  according  to
factor  income,  gain,  on  average,  4.0  (the  entire  sample)  or  4.2  (EDs  only)
percentage  points.  Their  share  increases  from  1.9 and  1.8 percent  of  factor
income  to  5.9  or  6  percent  of  total  disposable  income.  '°  The  sharegain
decreases  with  level  of  (factor)  income,  and  becomes  practically  nil  for the
`0  Note that the same disposable  income share of the people who are  in the bottom  or the  second decile
according to factor income shows that, on average, is does not matter whether one is in among the bottom
10 percent or in the second decile according to factor income.11
fifth decile. The combined poorest  50 percent of people according to factor
incomes have a sharegain of  12.4 percentage points (in the entire sample) or
12.9 percentage points (for EDs only). The  people in the upper half of factor
income distribution are, of course, losers in redistribution.
Tables 3a and 3b are identical to Tables 2a and 2b except that we now
look  at  sharegain  between  factor  P  income  and  disposable  income. The
advantage  of  this  measure  is that  it  allows  us  not  to  treat  pensions  as  a
redistribution  transfer.  The  extent  of  redistribution  is  often  overestimated
when we look at the sharegain between factor and disposable income (as in
Tables  2a  and  2b).  Consider  the  following.  For  many  pensioners  state
pensions are often the only, or at least the most important, source of income.
According to factor income, penrsioners will tend to be ranked in lowest-
often the lowest-income  decile. Once we  move from factor  to gross and
disposable income, their positioin dramatically improves simply because they
have  received  a  significant  income  source-a  pension. "  Everything  else
being the same, a country with many pensioners (i.e. with older population)
will tend to show much larger redistribution:  the  sharegain will be greater.
Now, if  we take  the  view that pensions  are not primarily  a  redistributive
transfer  and  include  them  together  with  other  factor  incomes  in  factor  P
income, we can recalculate the sharegain as in Tables 3a and 3b. The extent
of  redistribution  is halved.  The  sharegain  goes  down  from  more than  12
percentage  points to 6 percentage  points  for the  whole sample,  6.4 for the
EDs.  Note  that  the  average  sharegain  is  about  halved  for  the  first  three
deciles, it stays about the same for the fourth decile, and increases for the
fifth decile.
" This is particularly noticeable for the East E  uropean countries. There pensioners have scarcely any other
source  of  income  than  pensions.  Factor income  shows them  to  be  very  poor,  and  since  pensions  are
relatively  high, the  sharegains  are  large.  Siimilarly, factor  income  Gini  is high.  But  once  we  include
pensions with other factor incomes, the "new poor" are not nearly as poor (factor P Gi:ni  goes down a lot),
and sharegains are much less.12
Table 2a. Redistribution (sharegain) by  decile for all countries
(from  factor to disposable income)
Average  Standard  Maximum (country)  Minimum (country)
gain  deviation
Bottom decile  5.7  2.4  9.9 (Slovakia 92)  0.1 (Taiwan 81 and 86)
Second decile  4.0  2.1  9.0 (Belgium 85)  0.1 (Taiwan 81 and 86)
8.9 (W. Germany 84)
Third decile  1.9  1.4  8.7 (Belgium 85)  0.1 (Taiwan 81, 86, 91)
5.1 (Sweden 92)
Fourth decile  0.7  0.6  2.8 (Sweden 95)  -0.3 (Italy 86)
Fifth decile  0.1  0.4  0.8 (Sweden 95)  -0.9 (Netherlands 94)
Bottom one-half  12.4  5.4  27.3 (Belgium 85)  0.3 (Taiwan 81)
(cumulative five  23.5 (Poland 95)
deciles)
Table 2b. Redistribution (sharegain) by  decile for established democracies
(from  factor to disposable income)
Average  Standard  Maximum (country).  Minimum (country)
gain  deviation
Bottom decile  5.8  2.0  9.7 (Luxembourg  1985)  2.9 (Sweden 1967)
Second decile  4.2  2.0  9.0 (Belgium 1985)  1.2 UK (1969)
8.9 (W. Germany  1984)
Third decile  1.9  1.4  8.7 (Belgium  1985)  0.2 (Germany 1973)
5.1 (Sweden 1992)
Fourth decile  0.8  0.6  2.8 (Sweden 1995)  -0.3 (Italy  1986)
Fifth decile  0.1  0.4  0.8 (Sweden 1995)  -0.9 (Netherlands  1994)
Bottom one-half  12.9  4.7  27.3 (Belgium 1985)  5.7 (Switzerland  1982)
(cumulative five  22.5 (Sweden 1992)
deciles)
Note: Data for Belgium 88 and 92 show zero or almost zero income for the bottom two deciles
according  to factor  income. If these  zeros are inaccurate,  redistribution  may be overestimated.  This is why
a maximum  redistribution  country  other  than Belgium  is shown  as well.13
Table 3a. Redistribution (sharegain) by  decile for all countries
(from  factor P income to disposable income)
Average  Standard  Maximum (country)  Minimum (country)
gain  deviation
Bottom decile  2.8  1.8  7.8 (Spain 80)  0.1 (Taiwan 81)
Second decile  1.4  0.9  4.5 (Norway 79)  0,1 (Taiwan 81)
Third decile  0.9  0.5  2.3 (Sweden 95)  0.0 (Italy 86)
Fourth decile  0.6  0.4  1.4 (Sweden 95)  -0.2 (Germany 73)
Fifth decile  0.3  0.3  0.9 (Sweden 81)  -0.5 (Spain 80)
Bottom one-half  6.0  3.1  12.7 (Norway 79)  0.3 (Taiwan 81)
(cumulative five
deciles)
Table 3b. Redistribution (sharegain) by  decile for established democracies
(using factor P and disposable income)
Average  Standard  Maximum (country)  Minimum (country)
gain  deviation
Bottom decile  3.0  1.7  7.8 (Spain 80)  10.5  (Italy 86)
Second decile  1.5  0.9  4.5 (Norway 79)  03.1  (Italy 86)
Third decile  0.9  0.5  2.3 (Sweden 95)  0.0 (Italy 86)
Fourth decile  0.6  0.4  1.4 (Sweden 95)  -0.2 (Germany 73)
Fifth decile  0.3  0.3  0.9 (Sweden 81)  -0.5 (Spain 80)
Bottom one-half  6.4  2.8  12.7 (Norway 79)  0.7 (Italy 86)
(cumulative five
deci les)
Note: Deciles  formed  according  to household  per capita factor  (or factor  P) income.
The increase  in  the share shows  the difference  between  the factor income  share of people who are
in the bottom  (second,  third etc.) decile  according  to factor  or factor  P income  and their share in disposable
income.
Table 4 shows  extent  of redistribution  by  country measured  by  the
increase in the share of the people who are in the bottom quintile and bottom
half  of  factor  income  distribut:ion. (For  simplicity,  we  shall  refer  to  the14
bottom  20  and  50  percent  of  the  population ranked  according  to factor
income as respectively "the very poor", and "the poor".)  The countries are
ranked by the gain in the share of the bottom half.  Belgium 85 and 88, and
Poland 95 shows the  largest redistribution  both to the  lowest  quintile  and
lowest  half  of  the  population. 12 In  Poland,  pensions,  which  have  grown
compared  to  wages  since  the  beginning  of transition,  are the  key  reason
behind  heavy  redistribution.' 3 As  expected,  Sweden,  Germany and  France
are heavily  redistributionist  with the  bottom  half  gaining between  18 and
221/2  percentage  points  (between  1 and almost 2 standard  deviations  above
the  mean),  and the  bottom  quintile  gaining  between  14 and  17percentage
points (more than 1 standard deviation above the mean). Redistribution is the
smallest in Taiwan,  Switzerland, UK in the  1970's,  and the US. In the US
97, for example, the bottom half gains about 8 percentage  points (almost  1
standard  deviation  less than the  mean); in  Switzerland  82,  5.7 percentage
points  (almost  1½2 below  the  mean).  The  table  displays  a  very  unique
position  of Taiwan. It is of particular  interest since Taiwan is the only non-
Western country  in the sample.' 4 Taiwan has by far the lowest factor income
inequality, Gini of 31 vs. the mean sample Gini of 46. But, perhaps precisely
because  factor-income  inequality  is  low,  redistribution  is  nil.  Neither  the
poor nor the very poor gain practically  anything in their disposable  income
share (the bottom  half gains between  0.3 and  1.4 percentage  points).  The
complete  data on  shares and gains  by  decile  and by  country are  given in
Annex Tables 2 and 3.
Table 5 shows the redistributional  gain when factor income is defined
to  include  pension  transfers.  Both  the  extent  of  redistribution  and  the
rankings  of  recipients  change.  The  most  redistributive  are  the  Nordic
countries: among the top five countries, four are Nordic; among the top ten
countries, six are Nordic." 5 Also, once we eliminate pensions, the ranking of
countries that have  large transfers  (most of which are  often pensions)  like
12 For  the  reasons  mentioned  above  (Table  2a),  the  Belgian  data  may  exaggerate  the  extent  of
redistribution.
"  This can be  seen from  Table 5 where the rankings  are  based on redistribution  from  factor P income:
Poland 95 slips from the second most redistributionist position to the seventh.
'4 The "non -Western"  means non-European, or of non-European settlement (like Australia, Canada or the
U.S.).
t  Although the concept of transfers  is narrower in Table 5 than in Table 4,  the sharegain (for any given
data point) need not be smaller. This is because the ranking of recipients changes and these new recipients
(that  constitute the bottom quintile or half of the distribution)  can be poorer and their  ain can be  greater
even if the concept of transfers is more limited.15
Germany, Italy and France, and which appear very strongly redistributionist
according  to factor income (Table 4) slips significantly.  In Germany in the
1980's, the poorest  quintile gained only 3 to 4 percentage  points as against
14-17 percentage  points  when  calculations  are  made  according  to  factor
income. Italy is shown to be among the least redistributionist  countries: the
bottom quintile and the bottom  half gain between  1 and 2 percentage points,
even if according to factor income it is more redistributionist than average.
The data in Tables 4 and 5 allows us also to see how redistribution in
individual countries  has  evolved through  time.  To  illustrate  it, we  look in
Figure  1 at four countries, and focus on the most redistributionist  measure:
sharegain  of  the bottom  quintil[e using the  factor  P income.  We  see that,
while during the Thatcher period social transfers in British might have gone
down  as  percentage  of  GDP,  the  sharegain  of  the  very  poor  improved
significantly.  So it did in Sweden and Canada, but not in the United States
where the sharegain of the very poor  in 1997 was the same as quarter of a
century ago, and was far smaller than in the other three countries.
Figure 1. Sharegain of the very poor, mid-1970's-mid-l990's
(using factor P income)
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Table  4. Redistributional  gain  of the bottom  quintile  and bottom  half of factor
income  distribution  (in percentage  points  of disposable  income)
Country (year)  Gain of the bottom quintile  Gain of the bottom half
Belgium 85  17.86  27.32
Poland 95  17.04  23.52
Belgium 88  17.15  22.88
Sweden 92  14.44  22.50
Sweden 95  13.43  21.74
Sweden 81  15.69  21.16
Sweden 87  15.55  20.44
Belgium  92  13.74  19.49
France 89  14.99  19.37
France 84  14.24  18.90
Germany 84  16.90  18.07
Slovakia 92  14.08  17.91
Germany 94  14.37  17.90
Hungary 91  12.31  17.83
Denmark 92  12.52  17.46
France 84  13.72  17.28
Czech republic 92  14.64  17.22
Denmark  87  13.72  17.05
Netherlands  87  13.87  17.05
Sweden 75  13.06  16.55
Netherlands 83  12.58  16.39
Germany 89  14.36  16.03
Luxembourg 94  14.25  15.53
UK 86  10.30  15.27
France 79  12.59  15.23
Germany 81  13.06  14.55
Italy 95  12.70  14.53
Ireland 87  9.72  14.35
Norway 95  10.73  14.27
Luxembourg 85  13.47  13.82
UK 95  8.78  13.73
Luxembourg 91  13.25  13.57
Italy 86  13.22  13.08
Italy 91  12.62  13.04
Finland 95  8.50  12.90
Norway 79  11.47  12.73
Norway 91  9.93  12.58
Poland 92  11.13  12.50
Netherlands  91  10.26  12.46
Spain 90  11.46  12.45
Germany 83  10.46  11.8417
UK 91  8.24  11.78
Germany 78  10.87  11.76
Norway 86  10.19  11.35
UK 79  9.31  11.22
Australia 94  8.25  11.13
Canada 94  7.81  11.09
Russia 95  7.24  11.02
Netherlands 94  10.63  10.92
Sweden 67  7.60  10.90
Canada 91  7.07  10.01
Finland  87  7.00  9.94
Israel  92  6.21  9.69
Israel  86  6.01  9.65
Finland  91  6.60  9.64
Spain 80  9.62  9.62
Australia 89  7.66  9.60
Australia 85  7.45  9.41
Poland 86  9.86  9.33
Australia 81  7.58  9.02
US 94  5.39  8.60
Germany 73  8.76  8.44
US 91  5.33  8.43
Canada 87  6.24  8.41
Russia 92  6.43  8.28
US 97  5.25  8.18
Israel 79  5.28  8.11
US 79  5.34  8.06
US 86  4.97  7.56
US 74  5.44  7.06
Canada 81  5.13  6.75
UK 69  5.76  6.74
Canada 75  4.97  6.67
UK 74  5.36  6.27
France 81  4.58  6.00
Switzerland 82  5.24  5.70
Taiwan 95  0.92  1.37
Taiwan 91  0.42  0.65
Taiwan 86  0.23  0.43
Taiwan 81  0.16  0.34
Average  9.75  12.44
Standard deviation  4.19  5.3918
Table 5. Redistributional gain of the bottom quintile and bottom half of factor P income
distribution (in percentage points of disposable income)
Country  (year)  Gain of the bottom quintile  Gain of the bottom  half
Norway  79  11.47  12.73
Denmark  87  10.26  12.35
Sweden  95  7.77  11.89
Denmark  92  8.74  11.88
Ireland  87  8.01  11.77
Netherlands  86  10.19  11.35
Poland  95  8.07  10.64
Netherlands  87  9.10  10.58
Finland  95  6.76  10.56
UK 86  6.70  9.96
Spain 80  9.62  9.62
Sweden  92  6.76  9.58
UK 95  6.77  9.46
Sweden  81  5.47  9.11
Netherlands  83  7.34  8.86
Belgium 92  5.79  8.79
Sweden  75  4.77  8.37
Australia  94  5.89  8.31
Germany  73  8.56  8.30
Slovakia  92  5.83  8.10
Sweden  87  4.81  7.78
UK 91  5.49  7.55
Israel 92  4.60  7.42
Norway  95  5.51  7.40
Hungary  91  4.88  7.32
Finland 91  4.48  7.26
Australia 89  5.10  7.08
Finland  87  4.23  7.07
Netherlands  91  6.01  7.01
Israel 86  3.90  6.82
Canada  94  4.42  6.75
UK 79  4.29  6.55
Norway 91  4.54  6.41
Netherlands  94  6.13  6.35
Canada  91  4.12  6.35
Australia 85  4.02  6.24
Czech  92  4.13  6.11
Australia  81  4.19  5.96
France 89  3.80  5.95
Israel 79  3.34  5.94
Belgium 88  5.15  5.90
Germany  94  3.68  5.8919
Belgium 85  4.83  5.80
France 84  3.13  5.58
Germany 81  3.69  5.47
France 79  3.01  5.34
Sweden 67  1.99  5.22
Canada 87  3.23  5.16
US 79  2.96  5.08
France 81  3.32  4.90
Germany 89  2.69  4.85
Germany 84  2.74  4.66
US 91  2.47  4.43
US 94  2.36  4.36
Canada 75  2.76  4.29
Canada 81  2.71  4.20
US 97  2.16  4.09
Luxembourg 94  3.21  4.04
US 86  2.13  3.94
Luxembourg 85  3.61  3.84
Germany 83  2.50  3.77
Poland 86  3.47  3.69
UK 69  2.32  3.45
US 74  1.98  3.37
Spain 90  3.07  3.33
Luxembourg 91  2.81  3.23
Germany 78  1.80  3.08
UK 74  1.84  2.93
Switzerland 82  1.28  2.07
Poland 92  1.41  1.97
Italy 95  1.60  1.85
Russia 92  0.79  1.51
Italy 91  1.05  1.16
Russia 95  0.48  0.95
Taiwan 95  0.53  0.78
Italy  86  0.59  0.67
Taiwan 91  0.30  0.54
Taiwan 86  0.21  0.41
Taiwan 81  0.14  0.32
Average  4.25  6.00
Standard deviation  2.57  3.1220
III. Testing the redistribution hypothesis
As mentioned in Section I, the relationship we want to test is:
(2)  R = f  (Im, Z)
We shall use two variables to capture redistribution:  how the share of
(i) the bottom half and of (ii) the bottom quintile (ranked by factor income)
increases when we move from factor (or factor P) to disposable income-the
variables just displayed in Tables 3 and 416  We denote them respectively  as
sharegain5O  and sharegain2O.
Our hypothesis throughout  is, of course, that bothgain  variables will
be positively related to factor income inequality em).  Several variables can
be used as indicators of factor income inequality: Gini coefficient of factor
income (Gm); the share of the bottom half (share5OMM); or the share of the
bottom quintile (share2OMAM)  where the double suffix MM  indicate that we
deal  with (i) the  distribution  of  factor  (=market)  income  and  (ii) that  the
recipients are ranked by their factor (=market) income.
Tables 6a and 6b shows the results of different versions of (2) for two
definition  of factor  income. In the version using the  standard  definition  of
factor income, we control for the share of population who are over 65 years
of age." 7 This is not necessary in the factor P formulation because pensions
are  included  as  part  of  factor  P  income.  In  each  table,  I  combine  two
indicators  of  redistribution  against  three  indicators  of  factor  income
inequality.
We  look first  at Table 6a, full-sample  regressions.  The coefficients
indicating that greater factor inequality is associated with greater gain of the
poor and the very poor have everywhere the correct sign, and are throughout
significant at 1 percent level. The same holds for the age variable in Table
6a. R2 is between 0.44 and 0.67.
16 Note that gain is defined across the same people. We do not compare the share of the bottom half ranked
according to factor income to the bottom half of the distribution  ranked according to disposable income.
1  An  income control  (either  as mean dollar  income  from  income  surveys or GDP  per capita)  is found
statistically insignificant in all formulations.21
Consider  the  expected gain of the poor:  each  Gini point  increase in
factor inequality is accompanied by 0.39 percentage  point gain of the poor
(equation  1.1). If  factor  income inequality  rises  by one  stanclard deviation
(5.8 Gini points;  see Table la),  the share of the poor  in disposable  income
would,  thanks  to  redistribution,  increase  by  2.3  percentage  points,  e.g.
instead of getting 20 percent of disposable income, they would receive 22.3
percent. The share of the very poor would increase by 1.2 percentage points
(0.205 from equation  1.2 times  5.9). The same results are obtained if instead
of the Gini coefficient, we use the share of the bottom half of the population
in  market  income  (Share5OMM)  or  Share2OMM.  The  results  are  even
stronger with the factor shares as controls (i  and the t-values are greater).
This  may be due to  the fact that  redistribution  occurs  in response  to low
shares of the poor or very poor in factor income, which the Gini coefficient
captures only imperfectly since it reflects the entire distribution (not only the
bottom of it). On average, the gain of the very poor is about one-half of the
gain of  the poor  (the  coefficient on sharegain2O  is  about  orne-half of  the
coefficient on sharegainSO).  18
,s  This holds for equations  I  and 2;  in equation  3,  the  relative  gain  of the  very poor  is greater  (1.09
compared to 1.6).22
Table 6a. Redistribution  as function  of factor  inequality  (using  factor  income)
All countries  Established  democracies
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)
Dependent  variable
Independent  variables  SharegainSO  Sharegain2O  Sharegain5O  Sharegain2O
(1) Gini for factor  incomes  0.392  0.205  0.475  0.213
(5.48)  (3.36)  (5.09)  (2.63)
Age over  65 (%)  1.11  0.93  1.24  0.98
(6.72)  (6.56)  (7.04)  (6.43)
Constant  -20.07  -11.70  -26.03  -13.10
(-5.71)  (-3.90)  (-5.16)  (-2.99)
R 2 0.56  0.47  0.53  0.43
(F)  (49.1)  (34.2)  (36.7)  (23.7)
(2) Share5OMM  -0.645  -0.335  -0.761  -0.339
(-6.27)  (-3.71)  (-5.98)  (-2.95)
Age over 65 (%)  1.04  0.892  1.18  0.958
(6.52)  (6.33)  (7.07)  (6.34)
Constant  11.46  4.73  11.51  3.71
(3.50)  (1.65)  (3.40)  (1.21)
R2  . 0.60  0.49  0.58  0.44
(F)  (56.7)  (36.3)  . (44.2)  (25.1)
(3) Share2OMM  -1.60  -1.09  -2.00  -1.30
(-7.97)  (-6.49)  (-7.40)  (-5.59)
Age over 65 (%)  0.77  0.668  0.99  0.824
(4.93)  (5.00)  (6.31)  (6.12)
Constant  5.98  3.65  3.47  1.53
(2.63)  (1.91)  (1.51)  (0.78)
R2  0.67  0.61  0.65  0.57
(F)  (76.6)  (59.7)  (58.8)  (42.7)
Number  of observations  79  79  67  67
Note: t-values  between  brackets.  Share5OMM=share  of total factor income  received by the bottom
half of the population  ranked by factor income.  Share2OMM=share  of total factor income received by the
bottom quintile  of the population  ranked  by market  income.23
Table 6b. Redistribution as function of factor inequality (using factor P income)
. All countries  Established democracies
.__ ___  ___  ___  ___  ___  __  ___Dependent  variable
Independent variables  SharegainSO  Sharegain2O  SharegainSO  - Sharegain2O
(1)Giniforfactorincomes  0.224  0.121  0.172  0.115
(4.28)  (2.74)  (2.60)  (1.98)
Constant  -2.99  -0.551  -0.485  -0.08
(-1.42)  (-0.31)  (-0.18)  (-0.04)
R2  0.19  0.09  0.09  0.06
(F)  (18.3)  (7.5)  (6.74)  (3.9)
(2) ShareSOMM  -0.385  -0.216  -0.293  -0.196
(-4.57)  (-3.05)  (-2.87)  (-2.17)
Constant  15.16  9.44  13.47  9.19
(7.37)  (5.45)  (5.48)  (4.26)
R2 0.21  0.11  0.11  0.07
(F)  (20.9)  (9.3)  (8 2)  (4.7)
(3) Share2OMM  -0.974  -0.691  -0.848  -0.70
(-7.06)  (-5.97)  (-5.17)  (-4.82)
Constant  10.66  7.61  10.38  7.80
(14.49)  (12.3)  (12.7)  (10.8)
R2  . 0.39  0.32  0.29  0.27
(F)  (49.8)  (35.6)  (26.7)  (23.4)
Number of observations  79  . 79  67  _  67
Note: t-values between brackets. Share5OMM=share  of total factor P income received by the
bottom half of the population ranked by factor income. Share2OMM=share  of total factor P income
received  by the bottom quintile  of the population  ranked  by market  income.24
The  same  equations  are  then  run  over  the  sample  of  established
democracies  where,  as  mentioned  before,  we  expect  to  find  the
redistributional  regularity  to hold  even more  strongly.  All the coefficients
again have the right sign and are statistically  significant at 1 percent  level.
Each Gini point increase in factor income inequality increases the share of
the poor in disposable income by 0.475 percentage points, and the share of
the  very  poor  by  0.213  points.  The  coefficients  on sharegain5O  and
sharegain2O are  greater,  in  absolute  amounts,  than  in  the  full-sample
regressions.  Thus,  for example, a percentage  point  decrease in the  factor-
income  share  of  the  poor  (ShareSOMM) increases  the  poor's  share  in
disposable income by 0.76 points in established democracies and  0.65 points
in the full sample  (equations 2.1 and 2.3). The fact that the coefficients  in
equations  2 and 3 are less than unity indicates that redistribution  does not
fully compensate  for the initially  lower share of the  bottom  half.  In  other
words, the poor in a country with lower factor income share of the poor (by 1
percentage point)  would still end up with a disposable  income share that is
less, on average, by 0.24 percentage  points (in EDs) or 0.35 points  (in full
sample) than the poor in a more factor-equal country.
This is not the case for the very poor. The redistribution  coefficients in
equations  3.2 and  3.4 are throughout  greater than  1. For the very poor,  in
effect, redistribution  more  than  compensates  for their  initially  lower  factor
share. Thus, each percent point drop in their factor income  share increases
the  poor's  share  in  disposable  income  by  1.3  percentage  points  (in
established  democracies)  and  1.09  percentage  points  in  established
democracies. Ironically, the poor are eventually better off if they start worse
off,
In  Table 6b,  I  run  the  same regressions  as  in Table  6a  except  that
factor income is now replaced by factor P income. age65 is no longer needed
as control variable.  The redistribution  coefficients have  again the right  sign
and  are but  one  are  highly  significant.  However,  the  k  are  significantly
lower. They increase though  as we move  from equations  1 (factor  Gini as
control) to equations  3 (share20MM as control). Once pensions are not part
of  social  transfers,  the  redistribution  that  we  capture  concerns  transfers
directed to the very poor. These transfers therefore explain much better what
happens to the very poor, as in equation 3. They matter much less for the rest
of the population.25
The most interesting regressions are 2.1 and 2.3 for the poor, and 3.2
and 3.4  for the  very poor. The poor's  gain  is now  half of what  it was in
earlier regressions when pensions were not part of factor income. For the full
sample, the  redistribution  coefficient  goes  down,  in absolute  value,  from
0.64 to 0.38 (equation 2.1).  Similarly,  for the  very poor, the  redistribution
coefficient  decreases  from  1.09  to  0.69  (equation  3.2).  Clearly,  lots  of
redistribution  simply occurs as result of pension payments. However, there is
more than that. It  is not  simply that once pensions  are included  as part of
factor income that total transfers (and redistribution)  are less. There is also a
re-ranking effect. By not considering pensions  as part of  factor income we
treat many households  who depend on pensions  for the large part of their
income as poor or very poor. However, once pensions are included in factor
income, many of  such households  are no longer poor. Thus, with  factor P
definition, not only is redistribution, by definition, less but both the poor and
very poor households  are different. And transfers shorn of pensions capture
much  better  what  happens  among  the  "new  poor"  (not  pensioners)  than
among the others.26
Figure 2. The poors' gain as function of their share in factor income
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Note: Share gain of the poor  is the difference  between the share of the bottom  half  of the population  in
disposable income and  factor income. The bottom  half of the population  are the 50 percent  of the people with the
lowest per capita factor income.
Figure 3. The very poors'  gain as function of their share in factor income
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How  large  is redistribution?  We  have  seen that  societies  that start with
a  more  unequal  distribution  of  factor  income  are  likely  to  exhibit  greater
redistribution.  That  gain  is  less-although  it persists-when  we  move  from
standard  definition  of  factor  income  to  the  one  that  includes  pension
transfers.  Now,  the  question  can be asked,  Will  redistribution  be so large  that
the  share  of the  poor  will  be independent,  in terms  of disposable  income,  of
their  starting  position?
Results  in  Table  7 test  the  extent  of the  gain.  The  share  ,of disposable
income  received  by the poor, Share5ODM,  is positively  related  to  their  share
in  factor income  whether  we use the  standard  definition  of factor  income,  or
factor  P income  (see  equations  1 and  3).  Each  percentage  point  increase  in
their  "starting  position",  raises  their  share  in disposable  income  by  0.355  (if
we  use  factor  income)  or  0.615  percentage  points  (if  we  use  factor  P
income).  The situation  is less clear  cut when  we look  at the  very  poor.  Their
share  in disposable  income  does not depend  on how  much  they receive  in the
form  of  factor  income  (note  the  very  small  and  statistically  not  significant
coefficient  in  equation  2),  but  is ]positively related  to  their  shaire in  factor  P
income  (equation  4).
Although  the  final position  of the  poor  and  the  very  poor  does  depend
on  what  their  initial  share  in  factor  and  factor  P income  is,  :redistribution
significantly  reduces  the  differences  which  might  exist  between  the  countries
at the  factor  income  level.  This  is  reflected  in  the  fact  that  the  coefficients
associated  with  ShareSOMM  and  Share2OMM  are  less  than  unity.
Redistribution  is  therefore  greater  in  societies  that  start  by  being  more
unequal,  but  is not  so great  as to  make the  position  of the poor  and  the  very
poor  independent  of what their  initial  shares  are.
Figure  4  illustrated  this  on  the  example  of  disposable  and  factor
income  Ginis.  The  difference  between  the  two  Ginis  increases  in  factor
income  Gini:  in  other  words,  redistribution  increases  in  factor  Gini,  but  the
slope  of the  line AA  is still positive-indicating  that greater  factor  inequality
still results,  on average,  in higher  disposable  income  inequality.28
Table 7. Extent of redistribution
Using factor income  |  Using factor P income  l
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  -
Share50DM  Share20DM  Share50DM  Share20DM
ShareSOMM  0.355  0.615
(3.45)  (7.30)
Share2OMM  -0.009  0.309
(-0.56)  (2.67)
Age over 65 (in %)  1.05  0.657
(6.52)  (4.89)
Constant  11.46  3.65  15.16  7.61
(3.50)  (1.91)  (7.32)  (12.3)
R2  0.37  0.31  0.41  0.08
(F)  (22.7)  (17.3)  (53.4)  (7.12)
Number of observations  79  79  79  79
Note: t-values  between  brackets.
Share5ODM=share  of total  disposable  income  received  by the bottom half of the population
ranked by factor  (market)  income.  Share5OMM=share  of total market  income  received  by the bottom  half
of the population  ranked  by factor  (market)  income.
Figure 4. Reduction in inequality (Gini) as a function
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IV. Testing  the median voter hypothesis
Our  conclusions  so  far  suggest  a  process  of  redistribution  that  is
positively associated with initial inequality in factor incomes. This is simply
an empirical finding. The problem  is to find an economic  explanation why
such  a particular  redistribution  would occur.  The median  voter hypothesis
provides one possible explanation. The median voter hypothesis,  in its most
abstract  version, posits  that,  if  preferences  are  single-peaked,  the  median
voter  will  decisively  determine  the  level  of  redistribution,  by  selecting  the
tax  rate  and thus  the  amount  of transfers  (taxes  are equal  to transfers)  that  is
optimal  for him.  Since  it assumes  that  the  tax  rate  is  increasing  in  income,
and  transfers  are  flat,  the  poorer  the  median  voter  relative  to  the  mean  (or
more generally,  the  lower  his position  in income  distribution),  the greater  the
incentive  to vote for higher  taxes,  and thus  for higher  transfers.
It is important  to  be very  clear what  the  hypothesis  says.  First,  it says
that  the  median  voter  must  gain  from  the  process  of  redistribution:  the
transfers  he receives  must  be  greater  than  taxes  he  pays,  for  otherwise  the
optimal  tax  rate for him  would  be zero  (Corollary  1). Second,  it doesnot  say
that  the  median  voter  will  necessarily  gain  more  than  any  other:  the  very
poor  would,  by  definition,  gain  more  than  the  median  voter  because  they
would  receive  the  same  amount  of  transfers,  but  will  pay  less  in  taxes
(Corollary  2).  Third,  it  says  that  the  poorer,  in  relative  terms  the  median
voter,  the  larger  his  gain  (Corollary  3).  We  shall  look  at  how  each  of  the
three  corollaries  performs.
Let the  median  voter  be the  one  belonging  to the  fifth  and  sixth  decile
of  factor  income  distribution.  We  have  already  seen  that sharegain  of  the
fifth  decile  (and  even  more  so of the  sixth  decile)  is negative,  regardless  of
what  factor  income  definition  we  use.  The  same  is  true  of  their  absolute
(dollar  or local currency)  gain. Table  8 illustrates  this fact:  it shows  that,  with
standard  definition  of factor  income,  the  fifth decile  on average  loses  through
redistribution  3.6  percent  of  its  disposable  income,  and  the  sixth  decile
almost  10 percent. Both  are thus,  on average,  net  tax payers.  Out  of  68
countries,' 9 the  fifth deciles  is a net tax  payer  in 49  countries,  while  it gains
9 For some countries the data on gross income (and thus on transfers) are not available, which causes the
decrease in the sample size.30
in 19; 20 the sixth decile is a net tax payer in 54 countries, and gains in only
14. A  typical  relationship  between  cash  transfers  and  taxes  is  shown  in
Figures  4a  and  4b.  The bottom  three  deciles  gain;  everybody  else  loses.
Therefore, our Corollary 1 does not seem to hold: the median voter would be
better  off  with  a  zero  tax  rate.  However,  this  conclusion  is  not  fully
warranted because  our  data take  into account  cash transfers  only.  Overall
cash transfers  in our  data base are in most  cases  (58  out of  68)  less than
21 taxes.  On average, direct taxes  are  1.6 times  greater than  cash transfers
(Table 8). For example, in the case of the Netherlands  and the US shown in
Figure 4 the tax-to-transfer ratio  is respectively  1.8 and 2.5. If we added to
cash transfers also transfers in kind (health, education, public administration
etc.) which too are  financed out of taxes,  overall transfers  would  increase
and it is quite  likely that, under  some reasonable  apportioning  of benefits
from transfers in kind, the median voter may  come out as net  beneficiary.
Still our data base does not allow us to test this hypothesis.  We thus have to
move to a weaker formulation of the median voter hypothesis, that is to test
the Corollary 3;22
Table 8. Net tax as percentage of disposable income
Average  Standard  Minimum (country)  Maximum (country)
deviation
Fifth decile  3.6  13.6  -43.1 (Poland 95)  33.2 (Netherlands 94)
Sixth decile  9.8  12.9  -32.9 (Poland 95)  36.2 (Netherlands 94)
Average  5.7  13.1  -36.5 (Poland 95)  28.2 (Israel 79)
Memo: Tax-  1.6  0.7  0.2 (Russia 92)  3.4 (UK 74)
transfer ratio
Note: Deciles  formed  according  to household  per capita factor income.
20 The countries  where the net taxes of the fifth decile are negative (as the theory would  predict it) are an
interesting group: Sweden in 1992 and  1995, Russia in 1992, Taiwan in 1991 and  1994, Ireland  in 1987,
Israel  in 1992,  Italy in  1986, Luxembourg  in  1986, France  in  1979,  1981,  1984 and  1989, and  Czech
republic in 1992.
21 Note that taxes include both mandatory employee contributions and direct taxes.
22 The Corollary 2 is satisfied in all cases (see Annex Tables 2 and 3).31
Table 4. Cash transfers and direct taxes by decile
(deciles formed according to factor income)
United States 1997  The Netherlands 1994
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Note: Amounts  on the vertical  axis in local currency.
We test  Corollary  3  by  looking  at the  relationship  between  R, the
sharegain  of  the  middle  class  (fifth and  sixth  decile  according  to  factor
income), and g the position of the median voter (at the factor income level),
and other variables Z.
(2)  R  f (p, Z)
Similar to the sharegain definitions above, we define the sharegain of
the middle class as the change in the percentage of total income!  received by
the  fifth  and sixth  decile  as  one moves  from  factor  to disposable  income
(sharegain5O6O)l. Ri  is alternatively  defined as  factor income  share  of the
middle class (Share5060MMj), and median income expressed  as percentage
of mean  income.  In both  formulations,  we expect  that  an improvement  in the
relative  position  of  the  middle  class  in  distribution  offactor  income  will
reduce its sharegain. The regssions  are conducted  for both  definitions  of
factor income (factor income and factor P income).
The variable sharegainS  60 is in all cases negative (see Annex Table
6). The mean sharegainS  06  is minus 6 percentage points,  and the range is32
from -12.1  (Belgium 1985) to -1.3  (Sweden 1995). The situation is the same
if  sharegain  is  defined  with  respect  to  factor  P  income.  The  mean
sharegain5O6O is then  minus 4.5  percentage  points  and the range  is from
-14.5 to -1.1. But we expect that the sharegain will be greater in countries
where the position of the middle class, before taxes and transfers "kick in", is
worse.  Table  9  gives  the  results.  They  show  that  each  percentage  point
decrease in the factor income share of the middle class is associated with a
0.2  to  0.3  point  increase  in  middle  class  sharegain.  The  coefficient  is
significant at  1 percent level in all formulations  except  in the case of EDs
and factor P income. However, the R2's are much lower than in the test of
the  redistribution  hypothesis.  The  fact that  the  coefficient  is  less  than  1
implies that redistribution  does not fully "compensate" the middle class in a
more unequal country for its lower factor income share.
Regressions  2.1 and 2.2 (Table 9) tests the same hypothesis using the
mean-to-median ratio  as a proxy  for the position  of the middle  class at the
factor income level. With factor income, we see that a 10 percent increase in
the  ratio-that  is  a  less  favorable position  of  the  middle  class-rises  the
sharegain of the middle class by 6 percentage  points (for the entire sample)
and 10 percentage points (for established democracies). When we use factor
P  income,  the  coefficient  ceases  to  be  statistically  significant  and  k
becomes practically zero.  This means that once we eliminate pensions from
cash  transfers,  the  middle  classes'  gain  or  loss  in  redistribution  is
independent  from the initial (factor) distribution. It is explained by the fact
that middle classes receive little  in the  form of non-pension  cash transfers
such  as  unemployment  benefits,  social  assistance  and  even  family
allowances. Thus, the median voter hypothesis  fails when  we focus on the
truly redistributive transfers only.33
Table 9. Middle class gain as function of initial position of the median voter
UJsing  factor income  Using factor P income
All sample  Established  All sample  Established
democracies  democracies
Independent variables  Sharegain50  Sharegain5O  SharegainSO  Sharegain5O
60  60  60  60
(I)  Middle class share  -0.208  -0.297  -0.252  -0.063
(share5O6OMA)  (-2.67)  (-2.85)  (-3.78)  (-0.73)
Age over 65 (%)  -0.081  -0.011
(-1.0)  (-0.10)
Constant  3.57  6.25  5.98  -1.71
(1.14)  (1.58)  (2.14)  (-0.47)
R2  0.12  0.14  0.16  0.01
(F)  (6.40)  (5.0)  (14.2)  (0.5)
(2) Mean-to-median ratio (in %)  6.02  10.05  2.47  1.93
(2.52)  (2.93)  (0.82)  (0.66)
Age over 65 (%)  -0.086  -0.008
(-1.03)  (0.94)
Constant  -12.26  -18.27  -7.51  -6.64
(-3.65)  (-3.7)  (-2.1)  (- 1.9)
R2  0.11  0.14  0.01  0.01
(F)  (4.6)  (5.2)  (0.7)  (0.4)
Number of observations  79  67  79  _  67
Note: t-values  between  brackets.  Share5O6OMM=share  of total factor income  received  by the fifth
and sixth decile of the population  ranked by factor income (=middle class). Sharegain5O6O=middle  class
gain as one moves  -from  factor  to disposable  income.34
V. Conclusions
The purpose  of the paper  was to twofold:  to test  the hypothesis of
inverse relationship between inequality in distribution  of factor income and
redistribution,  and  one  possible  political  channel  of  redistribution:  the
median voter hypothesis.
The paper's  approach is new in the sense that for the first time both
the  dependent  and  the  independent  variable  in the  redistribution  and the
median voter hypotheses  are correctly specified. The dependent  variable is
the extent of redistribution-income  share gain of the lower half of income
distribution according to factor income ('the poor"), or of the bottom quintile
("the  very  poor"),  or  the  middle  class  (fifth  and  sixth  decile).  The
independent variable is level of inequality of factor income or position of the
middle class  in factor  income distribution.  Neither  of  these two  variables
were  used  in  previous  work  because  they  are  not  easily  available.  The
hypothesis  is  tested  on  the  sample  of  24  countries,  with  a  total  of  79
observations.
We find strong support for the redistribution hypothesis. More unequal
factor-income  countries redistribute  more toward  the poor  and  very poor.
Consider a country A that has exactly the mean characteristics of our sample.
Its  factor  Gini  coefficient  would  be  46.3,  and  the  bottom  half  of  its
population  ("the poor"),  would receive  19.4 percent of total factor income.
When  we  move  to  disposable  income  distribution,  that  is  include  all
government cash transfers and personal taxes, the country would have a Gini
of 32.2, and the same  people  will have increased their  share to 32.1 percent
of  total  disposable  income.  The  poor  will  have  therefore  gained  a  12.7
percentage points share. Now, if we consider another country B, equal in all
respects  to A except  that  its factor  income  inequality  is higher  by  1 Gini
point. The poor's  gain in country B would reach  13.3 percentage points, i.e.
the  sharegain  would  be  0.65  percentage  points  greater.  Although  the
redistribution would have gone far toward equalizing the position of the poor
in the two countries, it would have still left the disposable-income position of
the poor  in country B worse than  in A, because the  sharegain  is less than
unity.  For  the  very  poor  (the bottom  quintile),  however,  redistribution  is
sufficiently  strong to  render their  position  in terms  of  disposable  income
share independent of their starting position (factor-income share).35
The effects of redistribution become much more muted once pensions
are taken  out of  transfers  and treated  as  factor  income. The negative  sign
between  the poor's  share  in factor income  and  sharegain  persists,  and the
coefficient remains  statistically highly  significant  throughout,  but  is much
smaller. It is about  V/2 of the previous size: between 0.3-0.4 rather than 0.6-
0.7.
Unlike  the  evidence  on  the  link  between  the  extent  of  pro-poor
redistribution, and factor income inequality, the evidence that redistribution
takes place through  the median voter  channel is much weaker. Our data-
based on cash transfers-do  not allow us to determine that the middle class
is a net beneficiary of redistribution. Moreover, comparing cash transfers and
taxes only, the middle income groups appear always to be losers. However, it
is likely that, if one included transfers in kind, the middle classes may turn
out to be net beneficiaries. Testing a weaker formulation of the median voter
hypothesis-namely  that  lower factor  income  share  of the  middle class  is
associated  with  their  greater  sharegain-we  find  that  it holds  so  long  as
pensions are included among cash transfers. Once we exclude them, there is
no  evidence that  the middle classes that  start from  a less  favorable factor
income position do redistribute more in their own favor.
The  median  voter  hypothesis  fails  once  we  focus  on  the  truly
redistributive  transfers  from which  the  middle  classes contemporaneously
gain little. This leaves us with three possible explanations. First, since those
poorer than the middle classes contemporaneously  gain, is the decisive voter
at a level income lower than the median?  This looks implausible  since the
recent work, if anything, has moved in the direction of finding the decisive
voter at a level higher than the median (see Bassett, Burkett and Putterman,
1  999).
Second, lack of contemporaneous middle-class gain may rnask a long-
run middle-class  gain from redistributive  programs.  Those  currently  in the
middle class will not profit from current  unemployment transfers.  But they
may be willing to finance them because they expect to receive them if they
lose their jobs.36
Third, a totally different.  political mechanism to explain redistribution
may have to be defined.37
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Annex  Table  ._.  Gini  coefficients
Factor  Factor P  Gross  Disposable  (4)-(1)
income  income  income  income
Australia 81  46.0  41.9  37.7  33.4  -12.6
85  47.7  .43.4  39.3  34.3  -13.4
89  48.5  45.1  39.7  35.0  -13.5
94  51.6  48.1  41.0  36.6  -15.1
Belgium 85  54.6  34.0  26.7  26.7  -27.8
88  50.0  34.4  26.9  26.9  -23.1
92  50.4  :38.0  31.8  26.0  -24.4
Canada 75  43.8  40.8  37.2  34.8  -9.0
81  42.9  39.8  36.5  33.9  -9.1
87  44.2  40.4  36.6  33.3  -10.8
91  45.5  41.5  36.4  32.6  -12.9
94  47.0  42.2  36.9  32.9  -14.1
Czech Republic 92  43.7  30.0  24.0  21.7  -22.0
Denmark 87  44.3  _  38.0  30.7  27.8  -16.5
92  47.2  40.3  30.5  26.0  -21.2
Finland 87  36.4  32.5  28.5  23.3  -13.1
91  36.6  33.5  28.5  23.9  -12.7
95  42.1  39.2  30.2  25.5  -16.6
France 79  50.9  42.8  38.1  34.6  -16.3
81  40.5  39.3  32.7  -7.8
84  52.2  42.8  37.9  34.4  -17.8
France  (b) 89  52.8  42.1  35.9  34.2  -18.6
W. Germany  73  40.3  40.2  32.5  31.1  -9.3
78  43.2  33.9  32.1  29.8  -13.4
81  44.1  34.8  31.4  29.4  -14.7
83  42.7  34.2  31.7  29.5  -13.2
84  47.9  35.5  33.1  29.3  -18.6
89  47.2  35.7  33.8  29.1  -18.0
94  50.4  39.4  35.9  31.2  -19.3
Hungary  91  52.0  39.2  30.3  30.3  -21.7
Ireland 87  55.6  53.2  41.7  37.7  -17.9
Israel  79  47.5  45.0  41.9  37.7  -9.9
86  50.7  47.7  43.2  37.8  -12.9
92  49.4  46.8  41.4  36.8  -12.6
Italy 86  46.1  34.0  33.7  -12.4
91  44.9  33.7  32.4  32.4  -12.5
95  51.3  39.8  37.6  37.6  -13.7
Luxembourg 85  41.7  32.6  27.9  -13.8
91  41.9  32.2  28.3  28.3  -13.6
94  44.0  33.1  28.0  28.0  -16.0
Netherlands  83  50.5  44.7  36.8  34.0  -16.640
87  49.7  44.3  35.6  32.7  -17.0
91  46.9  41.4  34.1  32.9  -13.9
94  45.0  40.0  34.0  33.8  -11.2
Norway 79  43.2  43.2  32.6  28.5  -14.7
86  39.5  39.5  29.0  25.5  -14.0
91  41.6  34.4  30.0  26.1  -15.5
95  44.3  36.5  30.5  26.7  -17.5
Poland 86  39.9  33.5  29.1  -10.8
92  45.9  36.3  33.8  33.8  -12.1
95  60.6  50.9  38.7  38.8  -21.7
ROC Taiwan 81  31.6  31.6  31.5  31.1  -0.5
86  31.4  31.4  31.3  30.8  -0.6
91  31.9  31.8  31.6  31.0  -0.9
95  32.9  32.1  31.4  31.0  -2.0
Russia 92  56.0  47.2  45.4  45.2  -10.8
95  62.0  50.0  48.8  48.8  -13.2
Slovak Republic 92  43.0  32.0  23.0  20.9  -22.1
Spain 80  45.9  45.9  35.7  35.7  -10.2
90  46.0  37.4  33.7  33.7  -12.4
Sweden 67  47.9  42.5  40.3  35.4  -12.4
75  45.6  35.6  31.1  25.5  -20.1
81  46.3  33.7  28.2  24.2  -22.0
87  47.5  34.1  29.2  25.5  -22.0
92  51.3  38.2  29.5  26.4  -24.9
95  50.4  40.5  29.9  26.2  -24.2
Switzerland 82  44.8  40.1  39.2  37.7  -7.1
U.K. 69  43.8  40.0  37.6  34.9  -8.9
74  39.3  34.9  33.8  31.1  -8.2
79  44.6  38.5  33.0  30.1  -14.5
86  52.6  46.6  37.5  34.3  -18.3
91  52.5  47.6  40.4  37.5  -15.0
95  54.7  50.0  41.2  38.1  -16.6
U.S.A. 74  46.8  42.7  41.1  37.8  -9.0
79  46.4  43.4  40.7  36.4  -9.9
86  48.7  45.0  43.1  39.2  -9.5
91  49.7  45.8  43.4  39.5  -10.2
94  52.4  48.3  45.9  41.7  -10.7
97  52.6  48.4  46.4  42.2  -10.3
Mean  464  39.8  35.0  32.2  -14.2
St. Deviation  5.9  5.6  5.5  5.3  5.5
Note: Gini coefficients calculated on per capita basis.41
Annex Table 2
GAIN IN SHARES  (in percent;
using  factor  income)
Countries, years  first  Second  third  Fourth  fifth  Five
deciles
(cumul)
Australia 81  4.5  3.1  1.0  0.4  0.1  9.0
85  4.2  3.3  1.2  0.6  0.2  9.4
89  4.2  3.5  1.3  0.5  0.2  9.6
94  4.0  4.2  2.0  0.7  0.2  11.1
Belgium 85  8.8  9.0  8.7  1.5  -0.8  27.3
88  8.6  8.5  3.7  2.3  -0.3  22.9
92  8.9  4.8  4.4  1.2  0.1  19.5
Canada 75  3.3  1.7  1.0  0.5  0.2  6.7
81  3.5  1.7  1.0  0.5  0.2  6.8
87  4.1  2.2  1.3  0.7  0.2  8.4
91  4.4  2.7  1.7  0.9  0.3  10.0
94  4.8  3.0  1.9  1.0  0.4  11.1
Czech Republic 92  9.2  5.4  2.0  0.7  -0.2  17.2
Denmark 87  8.0  5.7  2.9  0.8  -0.4  17.1
92  6.6  6.0  3.3  1.5  0.1  17.5
Finland 87  4.4  2.6  1.6  0.9  0.4  9.9
91  4.1  2.5  1.6  1.0  0.4  9.6
95  5.1  3.4  2.2  1.5  0.8  12.9
France 79  8.5  41  1.5  0.8  0.3  15.2
81  3.3  1.2  0.8  0.4  0.2  6.0
84  8.0  5.7  2.1  1.0  0.4  17.3
France (b) 89  7.8  7.2  2.9  1.3  0.2  19.4
W. Germany 73  6.0  2.8  0.2  -0.2  -0.4  8.4
78  6.2  4.7  1.0  0.1  -0.3  11.8
81  8.7  4.4  1.3  0.6  -0.4  14.6
.____  _  .. 83  6.0  4.5  1.3  0.3  -0.2  11.8
84  8.0  8.9  1.6  0.0  -0.4  18.1
8  9  7.7  6.6  1.8  0.2  -0.3  16.0
94  7.9  6.4  2.7  0.9  0.0  17.9
Hungary 91  7.0  5.3  3.0  1.8  0.7  17.8
Ireland 87  4.9  4.8  3.0  1.3  0.4  14.3
Israel 79  3.6  1.7  1.1  1.0  0.8  8.1
86  4.2  1.8  1.5  1.4  0.8  9.6
92  4.2  2.0  1.5  1.1  0.8  9.7
ltaly 86  7.5  5.7  0.6  -0.3  -0.4  13.1
91  6.5  6.2  0.7  0.0  -0.3  13.0
95  6.4  6.4  2.1  0.2  -0.5  14.5
Luxembourg 85  9.7  3.8  0.7  0.2  -0.5  13.842
91  8.6  4.7  0.6  0.3  -0.5  13.6
94  8.8  -5.4  1.0  0.6  -0.3  15.5
Netherlands  83  5.7  6.9  3.7  0.5  -0.3  16.4
87  7.1  6.8  2.6  0.7  -0.1  17.1
91  5.1  5.2  1.9  0.3  0.0  12.5
94  .6.1  4.6  1.3  -0.2  -0.9  10.9
Norway  79  7.0  4.5  1.3  0.2  -0.3  12.7
86  6.5  3.7  1.0  0.2  -0.1  11.3
91  6.0  3.9  1.8  0.7  0.2  12.6
95  5.8  4.9  2.5  1.0  0.0  14.3
Poland  86  7.9  2.0  0.2  -0.2  -0.5  9.3
92  7.6  3.5  1.3  0.3  -0.2  12.5
95  9.9  7.2  3.8  1.9  0.7  23.5
ROC  Taiwan  81  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.3
86  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4
91  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.6
95  0.7  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  1.4
Russia  92  4.3  2.1  0.9  0.6  0.3  8.3
95  4.7  2.5  1.9  1.1  0.7  11.0
Slovak  Republic  92  9.9  4.1  2.3  1.2  0.3  17.9
Spain  80  7.8  1.9  0.5  -0.1  -0.5  9.6
90  7.8  3.6  1.2  0.2  -0.4  12.4
Sweden  67  2.9  4.7  1.8  0.9  0.5  10.9
75  7.2  5.9  2.4  0.9  0.2  16.6
81  8.3  7.4  4.2  1.2  0.0  21.2
87  8.4  7.1  3.6  1.3  0.0  20.4
92  7.5  6.9  5.1  2.4  0.6  22.5
95  7.4  6.1  4.7  2.8  0.8  21.7
Switzerland  82  3.7  1.5  0.6  -0.1  0.0  5.7
U.K. 69  4.5  1.2  0.5  0.3  0.1  6.7
74  3.8  1.6  0.7  0.2  0.0  6.3
79  5.3  4.0  1.4  0.5  0.0  11.2
86  5.2  5.1  3.4  1.3  0.3  15.3
91  4.2  4.0  2.3  1.0  0.2  11.8
95  4.5  4.3  3.1  1.5  0.4  13.7
U.S.A. 74  3.4  2.0  0.9  0.5  0.2  7.1
79  3.3  2.1  1.4  0.8  0.6  8.1
86  3.1  1.9  1.3  0.9  0.4  7.6
91  3.2  2.2  1.5  1.0  0.6  8.4
94  3.1  2.2  1.5  1.0  0.6  8.6
97  3.2  2.1  1.4  0.9  0.6  8.2
Mean  5.7  4.0  1.9  0.7  0.1  12.4
St. Deviation  2.4  2.1  1.4  0.6  0.4  5.443
Annex Table 3
GAIN IN SHARES  (in percent;
using factor P income)
Countries,  years  first  Second  third  fourth  fifth  Five
deciles
(cumul)
Australia  81  2.8  1.4  0.8  0.7  0.3  6.0
85  2.6  1.4  1.0  0.8  0.4  6.2
89  3.3  1.8  1.0  0.6  0.3  7.1
94  3.4  2.5  1.3  0.7  0.3  8.3
Belgium  85  3.7  1.1  0.7  0.3  -0.1  5.8
88  3.9  1.2  0.6  0.2  0.0  5.9
92  3.9  1.9  1.3  0.9  0.7  8.8
Canada  75  1.8  1.0  0.7  0.5  0.3  4.3
81  1.7  1.0  0.7  0.4  0.4  4.2
87  2.1  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.4  5.2
91  2.6  1.5  1.0  0.7  0.5  6.3
94  2.8  1.6  1.0  0.8  0.5  6.8
Czech Republic  92  2.7  1.4  0.8  0.6  0.5  6.1
Denmark  87  7.6  2.6  1.5  0.6  0.0  12.3
92  5.7  3.0  1.9  1.0  0.3  11.9
Finland  87  2.5  1.7  1.3  1.0  0.6  7.1
91  2.7  1.8  1.4  0.9  0.5  7.3
95  4.4  2.4  1.8  1.3  0.8  10.6
France  79  1.6  1.4  1.0  0.7  0.5  5.3
81  2.1  1.2  0.8  0.6  0.2  4.9
84  1.6  1.5  1.1  0.8  0.5  5.6
France  (b) 89  2.3  1.5  1.0  0.7  0.4  6.0
W. Germany  73  5.8  2.7  0.3  -0.2  -0.4  8.3
78  1.2  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  3.1
81  2.6  1.0  0.8  0.5  0.5  5.5
83  1.8  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3  3.8
84  2.0  0.8  0.9  0.6  0.4  4.7
89  1.7  1.0  0.7  0.7  0.7  4.9
94  2.5  1.2  0.9  0.7  0.7  5.9
Hungary 91  2.9  2.0  1.6  0.7  0.2  7.3
Ireland 87  4.3  3.7  2.3  1.1  0.4  11.8
Israel  79  2.2  1.1_  1.0  0.9  0.7  5.9
86  2.4  1.')  1.2  0.9  0.8  6.8
92  3.0  1.6  1.2  1.0  0.7  7.4
Italy 86  0.5  0.1  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.7
91  0.9  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  1.2
95  1.1  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.0  1.8
Luxembourg  85  3.0  0.6  0.2  0.1  -0.1  3.844
91  2.2  0.6  0.4  0.0  0.0  3.2
94  2.4  '0.8  0.5  0.2  0.1  4.0
Netherlands  83  4.9  2.4  1.1  0.5  0.0  8.9
87  6.9  2.2  0.6  0.6  0.2  10.6
91  4.4  1.6  0.6  0.3  0.1  7.0
94  4.8  1.4  0.1  0.1  0.0  6.4
Norway  79  7.0  4.5  1.3  0.2  -0.3  12.7
86  6.5  3.7  1.0  0.2  -0.1  11.3
91  3.3  1.3  0.9  0.7  0.3  6.4
95  3.8  1.7  1.0  0.6  0.3  7.4
Poland  86  2.9  0.5  0.2  0.1  0.0  3.7
92  0.9  0.6  0.3  0.1  0.1  2.0
95  5.7  2.3  1.4  0.9  0.2  10.6
ROC  Taiwan  81  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.3
86  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.4
91  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.5
95  0.4  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.8
Russia  92  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.1  1.5
95  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  1.0
Slovak Republic  92  3.8  2.1  1.3  0.7  0.3  8.1
Spain  80  7.8  1.9  0.5  -0.1  -0.5  9.6
90  2.5  0.6  0.3  0.0  0.0  3.3
Sweden  67  0.7  1.3  1.2  1.1  0.9  5.2
75  2.7  2.1  1.7  1.1  0.9  8.4
81  3.7  1.8  1.6  1.1  0.9  9.1
87  2.9  1.9  1.4  1.1  0.5  7.8
92  4.3  2.5  1.7  0.9  0.2  9.6
95  4.9  2.9  2.3  1.4  0.4  11.9
Switzerland  82  0.9  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.3  2.1
U.K.  69  1.7  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  3.4
74  1.2  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.2  2.9
79  3.0  1.3  1.2  0.7  0.3  6.6
86  4.2  2.5  1.5  1.3  0.5  10.0
91  3.6  1.9  1.2  0.6  0.2  7.5
95  3.8  2.9  1.6  0.8  0.3  9.5
U.S.A.  74  1.2  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.3  3.4
79  1.9  1.1  0.8  0.7  0.6  5.1
86  1.3  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  3.9
91  1.5  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.5  4.4
94  1.4  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  4.4
97  1.2  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.6  4.1
Mean  2.8  1.4  0.9  0.6  0.3  6.0
St. Deviation  1.8  0.9  0.5  0.4  0.3  3.145
Annex Table 4
Factor  income  shares  (in percent)
Countries,  years  Bottom  Second  Third  Fourth  fifth  5deciles
decile  _
Australia 81  0.1  1.7  4.3  6.0  7.5  19.5
85  0.1  1.6  4.1  5.7  7.2  18.7
89  0.0  1.4  3.8  5.6  7.2  17.9
94  -0.5  0.5  2.9  5.2  7.3  15.5
Belgium  85  -0.1  0.0  0.0  4.6  7.7  12.1
88  0.0  0.0  4.3  4.3  7.3  15.9
92  0.0  0.0  2.1  5.7  7.9  15.6
Canada  75  0.2  2.6  4.6  6.2  7.6  21.3
81  0.4  2.8  4.7  6.2  7.6  21.7
87  0.4  2.6  4.5  6.0  7.4  20.9
91  0.2  2.3  4.3  5.8  7.4  20.0
94  0.1  1.9  4.0  5.7  7.3  18.9
Czech Republic  92  0.0  1.7  4.7  6.6  8.2  21.2
Denmark  87  -0.3  1.4  4.3  6.6  8.5  20.5
92  -0.3  0.8  3.5  6.1  8.2  18.4
Finland  87  1.5  3.8  5.5  6.9  8.2  25.9
91  1.5  r3.9  5.5  6.8  8.1  25.7
95  0.7  :3.0  4.7  6.2  7.6  22.2
France  79  -0.2  1.6  3.6  5.2  6.8  17.0
81  0.8  3.5  4.8  6.2  7.6  22.8
84  -0.4  _  1.2  3.4  5.0  6.6  15.9
France  (b) 89  0.0  0.5  2.7  4.9  6.8  14.8
W. Germany  73  0.5  3.4  5.4  6.7  7.9  23.9
78  0.4  2.5  5.0  6.4  7.7  22.0
81  0.0  2.1  4.8  6.3  7.8  21.0
83  0.5  2.7  4.9  6.3  7.7  22.1
84  0.0  0.7  3.9  6.0  7.6  18.3
89  0.0  1.2  4.2  6.1  7.5  19.1
94  0.0  0.8  3.3  5.5  7.2  16.9
Hungary  91  . 0.0  0.6  2.7  5.3  7.2  15.9
Ireland  87  -0.4  0.4  2.4  4.5  6.4  13.4
Israel  79  0.7  2.4  3.7  5.0  6.6  18.5
86  0.2  2.0  3.4  4.8  6.4  16.9
92  0.2  2.2  3.7  5.0  6.5  17.7
Italy 86  0.0  1.3  4.3  6.2  7.7  19.5
91  0.1  1.6  4.7  6.2  7.8  20.5
95  -0.5  0.9  3.2  5.4  7.1  16.2
Luxembourg  85  0.0  2.7  5.1  6.6  8.0  22.5
91  0.1  2.6  5.3  6.6  8.1  22.7
94  0.0  2.1  4.8  6.3  7.7  21.0
Netherlands  83  0.0  0.5  3.4  5.9  7.3  17.046
87  0.0  0.7  3.8  5.7  7.1  17.4
91  0.0  1.5  4.4  6.1  7.3  19.3
94  0.0  2.0  4.7  6.2  7.5  20.4
Norway 79  -0.1  2.3  5.0  6.6  7.9  21.7
86  0.4  2.9  5.4  7.0  8.3  23.9
91  0.5  2.7  5.0  6.5  7.9  22.5
95  0.3  2.0  4.4  6.3  7.8  20.8
Poland 86  0.2  3.0  5.3  6.8  8.3  23.6
92  0.2  2.1  4.2  5.8  7.4  19.6
95  -2.1  0.2  1.8  4.1  6.2  10.3
ROC Taiwan 81  3.7  5.0  6.0  6.9  7.8  29.5
86  3.7  5.1  6.0  6.9  7.9  29.7
91  3.5  5.0  6.0  6.9  7.9  29.2
95  3.3  4.8  5.8  6.8  7.8  28.5
Russia 92  -0.2  1.0  2.9  4.5  6.1  14.3
95  0.0  0.3  1.4  3.1  5.1  9.8
Slovak Republic 92  0.0  2.2  4.6  6.5  8.1  21.4
Spain 80  0.0  2.0  4.3  6.1  7.6  20.1
90  0.0  1.7  4.3  6.2  7.7  19.8
Sweden 67  0.0  0.8  4.0  6.1  7.6  18.5
75  0.0  1.5  4.2  6.1  7.8  19.6
81  -0. 1  1.4  3.7  6.0  7.7  18.6
87  0.0  1.2  3.3  5.7  7.6  17.9
92  -0.3  0.9  2.4  4.9  7.1  15.1
95  0°0  1.3  2.8  4.9  6.9  15.9
Switzerland 82  0.9  3.2  4.6  5.6  6.9  21.3
U.K. 69  08  3.5  4.8  5.8  7.0  21.9
74  1.4  3.5  5.2  6.5  7.7  24.3
79  0.1  1.9  4.5  6.2  7.8  20.4
86  -0.2  0.4  2.5  5.0  7.0  14.8
91  0.0  0.6  2.8  4.9  6.8  15.2
95  0.0  0.3  2.0  4.5  6.7  13.5
U.S.A. 74  0.0  2.2  4.2  5.8  7.2  19.4
79  0.1  2.2  4.1  5.7  7.3  19.4
86  0.1  1.8  3.7  5.4  6.9  17.9
.~~~~~1. 91  0.1  1.7  3.5  5.1  6.8  17.2
94  0.0  1.4  3.1  4.8  6.4  15.7
97  0.1  1.7  3.3  4.8  6.3  16.1
Mean  0.3  1.9  4.0  5.8  7.4  19.4
_St.  Deviation  0.9  1.2  1.1  0.8  0.6  1  4.047
Annex Table 5
Shares  in factor  P income  (in percent)
Countries, years  Bottom  second  third  Fourth  fifth  5deciles
decile
Australia 81  0.6  3.3  5.0  6.1  7.4  22.4
85  0.6  3.3  4.8  5.8  7.1  21.7
89  0.3  2.7  4.5  5.8  7.1  20.3
94  -0.4  1.7  4.0  5.7  7.2  18.1
Belgium 85  1.1  4.5  6.0  7.3  8.6  27.5
88  1.0  4.5  6.0  73  8.6  27.4
92  0.8  3.8  5.5  6.8  8.0  24.9
Canada 75  0.9  3.5  5.1  6.3  7.6  23.3
81  1.1  3.7  5.2  6.4  7.5  23.9
87  1.0  3.6  5.1  6.3  7.5  235
91  0.8  33  5.0  6.3  7.5  22.9
94  0.6  3.1  4.9  6.3  7.5  22.4
Czech Republic 92  3.0  5.3  66  7.5  8.4  30.7
Denmark 87  0.5  3.9  5.4  6.9  8.3  25.0
92  0.0  _3.2  5.4  6.7  8.2  23.5
Finland 87  2.6  4.7  5.9  7.0  8.2  28.5
91  2.4  4.6  5.9  6.9  8.1  27.9
95  1.1  :3.7  5.3  6.5  7.7  24.3
France 79  1.4  3.3  4.6  5.9  7.2  22.4
81  1.2  3.6  4.9  6.3  77  23.7
84  1.2  3.3  4.6  5.9  7.3  22.2
France (b) 89  0.8  3.3  4.8  6.2  7.6  22.6
W. Germany 73  0.6  3.4  5.4  6.7  7.9  24.0
78  3.0  4.8  5.8  6.7  7.7  28.1
81  2.3  4.6  5.8  6.7  7.7  27.2
83  2.7  4.7  5.8  6.7  7.8  27.7
84  2.2  4.5  5.6  6.7  7.8  26.8
89  2.3  4.5  5.7  6.6  7.7  26.8
94  1.3  4.0  5.4  6.5  7.5  24.6
Hungary 91  0.9  3.5  5.4  6.8  8.1  24.7
Ireland 87  -0.4  0.8  3.1  4.9  6.7  15.1
Israel 79  1.4  3.0  4.0  5.2  6.7  20.2
86  0.8  2.6  3.8  5.2  6.6  18.9
92  0.7  2.7  4.0  5.3  6.7  19.4
Italy 86  2.6  4.6  5.7  6.8  7.8  27.5
91  2.5  4.6  5.8  6.9  8.1  27.8
95  1.1  3.7  5.0  6.3  7.7  23.9
Luxembourg 85  2.2  4.8  6.0  7.1  8.2  28.4
91  2.6  4.8  6.0  7.3  8.2  28.9
94  2.4  4.6  5.8  7.1  8.3  28.1
Netherlands 83  0.0  2.6  5.0  6.3  7.4  21.248
87  0.0  2.7  5.0  6.2  7.4  21.4
91  0.2  3.6  5.4  6.4  7.5  23.2
94  0.4  3.9  5.4  6.5  7.6  23.9
Norway 79  -0.1  2.3  5.0  6.6  7.9  21.7
86  0.4  2.9  5.4  7.0  8.3  23.9
91  2.1  4.6  5.8  6.9  8.0  27.4
95  1.4  4.3  5.7  6.8  7.9  26.2
Poland  86  1.8  4.6  5.9  7.2  8.4  27.9
92  2.1  4.1  5.4  6.6  7.9  26.0
95  -2.1  2.0  4.0  5.7  7.3  16.9
ROC  Taiwan  81  3.7  5.0  6.0  6.9  7.8  29.5
86  3.7  5.1  6.0  6.9  7.9  29.7
91  3.6  5.0  6.0  6.9  7.8  29.3
95  3.5  5.0  5.9  6.8  7.8  29.0
Russia  92  1.1  3.2  4.2  5.3  6.5  20.2
95  0.4  2.2  3.8  5.3  6.5  18.2
Slovak Republic  92  2.0  4.7  6.2  7.5  8.7  29.0
Spain  80  0.0  2.0  4.3  6.1  7.6  20.1
90  1.4  4.1  5.6  6.7  7.8  25.6
Sweden  67  0.1  3.2  5.1  6.4  7.6  22.4
75  2.4  4.4  5.3  6.5  7.7  26.3
81  2.0  4.7  5.8  6.9  8.0  27.5
87  2.0  4.6  5.8  6.9  8.1  27.3
92  0.7  3.6  5.3  6.7  8.1  24.4
95  0.4  3.0  5.0  6.5  7.9  23.0
Switzerland  82  2.4  4.1  5.0  5.9  7.0  24.4
U.K. 69  1.9  4.0  5.1  6.1  7.1  24.2
74  2.7  4.6  5.7  6.6  7.7  27.2
79  1.2  4.1  5.3  6.4  7.6  24.6
86  -0.2  2.0  4.5  5.8  7.2  19.3
91  0.0  2.2  4.1  5.4  7.0  18.8
95  0.0  1.1  3.7  5.3  6.9  17.1
U.S.A. 74  0.8  3.3  4.8  6.1  7.3  22.3
79  0.6  3.0  4.6  6.0  7.4  21.5
86  0.6  2.7  4.3  5.7  7.1  20.5
91  0.5  2.6  4.1  5.6  7.1  19.9
94  0.4  2.3  3.9  5.3  6.7  18.6
97  0.7  2.6  3.9  5.2  6.5  19.0
Mean  1.2  3.6  5.1  6.4  7.6  24.0
St. Deviation  1.1  1.0  0.7  0.6  0.5  3.649
Annex Table 6
Shares and sharegains of the middle class
Countries, years  Shares of 5 and 6  Share  Share of 5 and 6  Share
decile in factor  gain  decile in factor P  gain
income  income
Australia 81  41.5  -6.7  40.5  -4.4
85  40.1  -6.0  39.3  -4.0
89  40.3  -6.7  39.7  -5.1
94  41.0  -7.4  40.4  -5.5
Belgium 85  44.5  -12.1  46.1  -5.8
88  42.4  -8.3  45.9  -5.8
92  44.2  -7.1  43.8  -2.5
Canada 75  41.9  -5.5  41.5  -4.7
81  41.7  -5.6  41.3  -4.5
87  41.0  -5.1  41.1  -3.9
91  40.9  -4.7  41.1  -3.5
94  40.8  -4.8  41.2  -3.5
Czech Republic 92  44.7  -6.3  44.0  -1.5
Denmark 87  46.3  -7.4  44.8  -5.4
92  45.4  -5.5  44.4  -4.0
Finland 87  44.4  -3.4  43.9  -2.0
91  43.9  -3.1  43.6  -2.5
95  41.8  -1.8  42.0  -1.4
France 79  38.2  -5.4  39.3  -3.5
81  42.5  -6.5  42.5  -5.7
84  37.9  -5.1  39.9  -3.7
France (b) 89  39.1  -6.3  41.2  -4.0
W. Germany 73  42.6  -7.6  42.5  -7.5
78  42.0  -7.0  41.3  -3.2
81  42.5  -6.8  41.6  -3.0
83  42.2  -6.9  41.8  -3.6
84  42.0  -9.3  41.9  -3.1
89  41.5  -7.8  41.2  -1.9
94  40.2  -6.2  40.8  -2.3
Hungary 91  40.0  -2.4  43.7  -4.1
Ireland 87  37.0  -5.5  38.2  -5.3
Israel 79  37.9  -4.3  38.0  -4.4
86  36.5  -3.0  37.1  -3.3
92  37.0  -3.2  37.4  -3.5
Italy 86  42.5  -9.7  42.6  -5.9
91  42.5  -8.1  43.3  -5.9
95  40.0  -9.5  42.0  -6.7
Luxembourg 85  43.9  -8.0  44.1  -5.9
91  44.1  -8.0  44.0  -5.3
94  42.7  -6.9  44.5  -5.250
Netherlands  83  40.0  -6.7  40.2  -5.0
87  39.7  -5.9  40.4  -4.1
91  40.3  -6.1  40.8  -4.8
94  41.4  -9.7  41.3  -5.7
Norway  79  43.0  -7.0  43.0  -7.0
86  44.9  -6.4  44.9  -6.4
91  43.4  -5.3  43.1  -3.5
95  43.0  -5.2  42.8  -3.7
Poland  86  45.3  -9.3  45.0  -6.0
92  41.0  -7.9  42.9  -6.2
95  36.4  -4.0  40.9  -5.7
ROC  Taiwan  81  41.8  -4.6  41.8  -4.6
86  41.9  -4.6  41.9  -4.6
91  41.9  -4.7  41.8  -4.6
95  41.7  -4.7  41.9  -4.9
Russia  92  34.7  -5.9  35.8  -5.4
95  30.4  -5.5  35.9  -5.6
Slovak Republic  92  44.5  -4.2  46.1  -3.3
Spain 80  41.7  -8.7  41.7  -8.7
90  42.2  -8.0  42.4  -6.1
Sweden  67  41.8  -4.1  41.2  -1.3
75  43.0  -5.6  41.7  -1.5
81  43.2  -5.8  43.4  -1.1
87  42.8  -6.1  43.6  -2.3
92  40.8  -3.4  44.0  -4.5
95  39.8  -1.3  43.6  -3.0
Switzerland  82  38.0  -6.9  37.9  -4.4
U.K. 69  38.2  -5.0  38.3  -3.9
74  41.9  -5.8  41.2  -4.1
79  42.8  -6.6  41.6  -4.0
86  40.0  -6.0  40.1  -3.2
91  38.9  -6.6  39.1  -6.1
95  38.5  -6.0  39.2  -5.8
U.S.A.  74  40.3  -6.0  40.2  -4.8
79  40.5  -4.6  40.6  -4.0
86  39.0  -5.2  39.4  -4.5
91  38.8  -4.9  39.5  -5.0
94  36.6  -4.5  37.6  -4.6
97  35.6  -4.2_  36.4  -4.1
Mean  41.0  -6.0  41.5  -4.4
St. Deviation  2.7  1.9  2.3  1.5
Notes: Deciles are formed according to factor or factor P income. The first decile, (e.g.) consists
of the  10 percent of people with lowest household per capita income. The share gain is defined as the
change in the share of these people as income concept changes from factor (or factor P) income to
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